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et al.: Comments to Hutt Speech

COMMENTS TO HIUTT SPEECH
P'OFESSOR STAIRRS:

I most emphatically approve of the majority of Mr. Hutt's
participation and recommendations in the Driver and Easter
cases and others in which he is now involved. I particularly
approve of his efforts to keep involuntary commitment procedures within bounds with respect to the chronic alcoholic or others
afflicted with behaviorial disorders. However, I am, as I will
touch upon more definitely tomorrow, somewhat troubled by the
thrust of his arguments in the legal sphere made in Easter and
Driver. I am troubled because I await expansions, such as those
which have been detailed by Mr. Hutt on the legislative level
today, resulting from Driver and Easter. But I am not thinking
of legislative expansions, I am thinking of judicial expansions
which might trouble the courts and the community as well. I
particularly refer to his discarded second theory which he presented as one of the possibilities in approaching the legal problems in Driver and Easter. I think the best way to explain my
difficulty is to refer to Judge Murtaugh in New York, the
Administrative Judge of the New York Criminal Court, who
has indicated that in New York, from 1940 until the recent
enactment of a public intoxication statute on the state level,
there have been no arrests for public intoxication without some
showing of a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct. I would
assume that merely being obnoxious is not enough for the purpose of showing such a breach of peace. In other words, the
thrust, as I view it, that should have been made in Driver and
Easter is to the public intoxication statutes themselves. The advantages of this would have been that other crimes committed
by intoxicants who claim to be alcoholics would not have come
immediately before the courts on the theory that chronic alcoholism is a disease. The issue, therefore, would have been confined to one crime and one crime alone--public intoxication. In
view of the reality of police practice in this area. Driver and
Easter mean that alcoholics should not be convicted on public
intoxication, but other persons who are not considered to be alcoholics may properly be arrested and convicted; thus, police may
continue to waste their efforts and abuse their authority as they
have long done, and I find that considerably bothersome.
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. The second aspect which troubles me is Mr. Hutt's reference to
courts on the very local level raising these issues on their own
motion. Here, too, I think the thrust should be different. I do
not believe that the onus should be placed upon the courts; I
think that the responsibility rests on the legal profession to bring
their talents to bear in local courts. I believe that it is the function of the lawyer to operate in the lower courts and not the
function of the judge to stand in the lawyer's stead. The longrange approach should be oriented so as to encourage lawyers
to participate at the lower levels. If we succeed, there will be
an entire upheaval and change in those courts which I think is
sorely needed.
MR. HuTT:

Jim, I would like to hear your views on whether the Murtaugh
approach-and I have discussed Judge Murtaugh's views with
him on several occasions-wouldn't raise more serious expansion
questions by getting into the area of whether suicide can be a
crime, adultery can be a crime, consenting homosexuality a
crime. In the long run, wouldn't that create a greater expansion
than the possibility which I have raised-that it will eventually
prove to be true that alcoholism could be a defense to murder, if
the correct causation is proved. I might explain to this audience
that in 1869 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled, in
quite a revolutionary case, that alcoholism would be a defense to
the crime of murder; and, as I have pointed out on several
occasions, I have never viewed New Hampshire as being a haven
for murdering alcoholics. I don't think it is any different in
that state than it is in any other jurisdiction. People don't
migrate for purposes of evading the criminal law. Could I have
your comment on that?
PRoFEssoR STAMPS:

On the issue of judgment, what you are admitting is that, yes,
you have engaged in a conservative expansion by the development of this chronic alcoholism defense. The expansion is possible in the area of murders and public intoxication, and the
courts are now confronted with that problem. On the lowest
possible level, disorderly conduct would soon escalate to other
levels-robberies, burglaries, housebreakings, etc.; so necessarily
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there will be expansions under your theory, and lawyers will be
lacking in imagination if they do not use these theories for that
purpose. However, I don't think that, on the basis of current
criminal theory, there will be this kind of expansion if you
merely use the Murtaugh approach and strike down public intoxication. I say that because there are various categories of
harms prevented by criminal statues, only one of which is the
aggressive harm, such as disorderly conduct or breach of the
peace. There is very little aggressive harm, for example, in
statutory rape and yet it is punishable. We call this social harm.
I don't think that it is necessary to belabor the logic of Murtaugh's approach, which relates only to aggressive harm-not to
other harms which are not aggressive and have always been
punished by the law.
Mn. HuTT:

But it was precisely because of what you just said that I concluded that I had a chance of losing with the Murtaugh argument, though I knew I would win on the involuntary argument.
I didn't want to take the chance of presenting an argument that
could possibly lose. This is solely a matter of judgment.
PnOxnSSor STA tS:
Could I say that Judge Murtaugh didn't lose. In 1934 and
1935 the judges in New York on their own said that there can be
no arrest without a breach of the peace, and a showing of intoxication alone was not enough. I fail to see why you are so assured
that in 1966, courts would act differently from 1934 and 1935.
MR. HuTT:

But I would point out that, in the meanwhile, the judges of
New York closed their eyes while these people were paraded
before the courts on the charges of disorderly conduct when
there was no disorderly conduct involved. Judge Murtaugh admits this in his article in Fordham Law Review. As a matter of
fact, in March or April of this past year, for the first time they
provided counsel for one solid month to everyone who appeared
in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. Well, over 95
percent of those charged with disorderly conduct, who had also
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been drunk, were acquitted for lack of any showing of disorderly
conduct. What had happened in New York was that you had a
meaningless legal pronouncement which then had been enacted
into a statutory provision and was never thereafter challenged,
so that it made absolutely no difference to actual practice.
To get back to what Jim was saying about the need for counsel in these courts, if I mention one word about the need for
counsel in the District of Columbia, we would have between 200
and 300 inebriates appearing before the courts. I don't see how
a lawyer could possibly defend 200 or 300 people if you used a
public defender system, and I really don't know where you would
get 200 or 300 lawyers to go down every morning to the Court
of General Sessions, which is not the most public place I have
ever practiced law. That is a very practical problem. I honestly
believe that in this area of a social offense type of crime, almost
a non-crime crime, a judge is perfectly capable of handling the
whole thing himself, unless it involves involuntary commitment,
an area in which legal protection is definitely necessary.
PRoFssoR MYERS:

How does the District of Columbia handle the problem of a
strong tendency on the part of law enforcement personnel to
arrest for drunken and disorderly conduct in order to escape the
strictures of Driver and Easter against a public drunkenness
arrest?
MR. Hu r:

This was the reason I spent a great deal of time discussing
with the D.C. Crime Commission how the new statute should
read. The D.C. Crime Commission finally came to the conclusion that it should specifically recommend in its report to the
President that normal manifestations of drunkenness did not
constitute disorderly conduct. This was done in order to head off
the problem you describe. After the Easter decision, there was
an increase in disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, and other
similar offenses. That increase still shows up in our statistics.
A number of judges immediately saw through these statistics and
frankly used the Easter defense to those offenses.
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PnorssoR MYEIs:
It was primarily a question of a selling job to the law enforcement officers and judges.

Mn. HuTT:
Criminal justice is no better than the judge. If you have
judges, as we have, who really intend to enforce the Easter decision, come what may, these small tricks by the police are not
going to help.
One other aspect I want to mention concerns the argument
that the court should raise these defenses. My suggestion is not
necessarily that we ought to get all of the lawyers out of the
lower courts. My point is that there are no lawyers there now.
If we could persuade lawyers to represent derelict alcoholics,
that would be a very fine state of affairs; but that is not going
to happen readily unless we get a public defender system.
PROFESSOR STARRS:
It is equally unrealistic to assume that judges will raise these
defenses sua sponte.

MR. HuTT:
They did in the District!
MR. MoCoM:
Theoretically, I agree with Mr. Hutt on this question on voluntary and involuntary treatment. Again, theoretically, I think
everyone should have an infinite amount of freedom. But when
you come down to the practical aspects of alcoholism programming you realize that when you generalize about all categories
of alcoholics you ignore the innovations which may someday
allow alcoholics to be classified much as the mentally ill are
classified. When the subject is not in a prolonged psychotic
state, yet at a given time he is unable to make a logical decision
and is not in isolation, but .affects his family and many others
around him, don't we have the right to intervene, maybe not
from the standpoint of our concern for this person but to keep
him from harming others and himself. Most of the time we say,
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"don't let him hurt some innocent, person." He is probably just
as decent as anyone else, but I think there is a definite need for
involuntary commitment procedures in such a case, though I
realize that a great majority of the involuntary commitment
codes are vindictive, punitive and unrealistic in their approach
to the treatment of alcoholism as an illness. It will not always
be necessary to use an involuntary commitment, but since most
states are moving very slowly towards any sort of commitment
and treatment, the involuntary approach may be necessary for
quite some time to come.
PROFESSOR MYERS:

I would like to note that there are many different shades of
legal compulsion. Certain types of legal compulsion would be
vital to a controlled alcoholic program. For example, to hold a
person for a brief period of time, twenty-four hours, would not
perhaps meet with objection; or to commit a person to an outpatient clinic and compel him to appear once a week might seem
permissible. The use of compulsory education for people who
may have been detected as drunk on several occasions by the
police might not seem objectionable.
MR. HuTT:
I would like to start by going back to the question about what
should be done if there are no resources. A- great many judges
and a great many leading citizens in cities around the country
have asked me about this problem in the last year. I do not think
that the community or the alcoholics who have been released on
the streets are any the worse for the near chaos which has resulted since the Easter decision. In Washington, we have released 4,382 people who used to be kept in the public workhouse.
They were being warehoused in the workhouses. Even in their
debilitated condition, they preferred the street to confinement.
I think that we must respect their right. The rights of the community were not seriously affected because the inebriates who
actually threatened harm to the public were being arrested for
a substantive crime and not merely for being drunk in public.
Initially we were confronted by a very difficult personal
judgment--"What are your chances of getting solid legislation
to provide adequate facilities if you don't create chaos!" Inves-
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tigation disclosed that no city or state had adequate legislation,
adequate facilities or adequate handling of the chronic inebriate
offender. We talked with citizens, we talked with officials; and
it was quite clear that they couldn't care less about this problem.
The only way that we in Washington could get help was to
create the absolute mess which we created. You cannot imagine
the mess which we did create. Some days 500 people came
through the courthouse, in one door and out the other, and often
they were picked up as soon as they got outside. The newspapers
provided full coverage and everyone was up in arms, but we had
to do this in order to create the public climate which would get
the resources that are necessary. The argument which says,
"Let's wait for the resources," is a circular one. The judges
asked me in each one of the appeals, "Isn't this a legislative
matter?" The answer to that is, I think, quite clear: suppose the
local hospital for the mentally ill burned down tomorrow, and
the next day a man was charged with a crime and pleaded insanity. Is he then jailed as a criminal instead of being put in a
public health facility? In other words, can constitutional questions be decided by the availability of facilities? They cannot
be! To get adequate facilities you may have to fight for them,
and you may have to use unusual tactics. On the question of
involuntary treatment, I think a man does have the right to die
without intervention. Courts have upheld this principle on
many occasions. The reason chronic inebriates have been involuntarily committed in the past without a court striking down
those laws is, in my opinion, because public inebriates lack representation. The D.C. Crime Commission and the U.S. Crime
Commission have both recommended voluntary treatment. The
D.C. Crime Commission went on to point out that involuntary
treatment would raise severe constitutional problems.
AuDmwcn:

What is the definition of a chronic alcoholic, and just how are
the courts going about making this determination?
M. HuTT:
Generally, chronic alcoholic is defined in the statutes in the
District of Columbia as a person who has lost self control in the
use of alcoholic beverages. The determination is made by doctors
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and qualified public health personnel who have diagnosed the
patient. It is not easy, I am confident, to decide when an individual passes over this mystical line between voluntary and
involuntary drinking. But I do not believe it is any less difficult for the psychiatrist to judge whether a person is or is not
mentally ill. My own feeling is that to the extent that we use
voluntary treatment, I am willing to use a broad definition of
alcoholism which says that an alcoholic is virtually any problem
drinker; to the extent that you would have involuntary commitment, then I would want to use a very restrictive definition, to
make certain that only the very severe cases are caught in an
involuntary treatment system. In the District of Columbia,
when a person who has not previously been adjudged an alcoholic is arrested for public intoxication, the public health nurse
will look at his arrest record. If his arrest record shows 100
arrests for drunkenness in the last ten years, it is quite clear that
this man has some kind of problem. She will then interview him
and spend some time with him, trying to figure out what the
problem is. Sometimes psychiatric social workers or psychiatrists become involved. They recommend to the court that the
man appears to be or appears not to be an alcoholic. The defendant can request a jury determination if he wishes. A lawyer
or one of the law school interns working with the court may be
appointed to represent the defendant. If the trial is held, the
medical officials take the stand and are subject to cross-examination and questioning by the judge. That describes the way
the system works.
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